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ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC EVOLUTION OF U. S. LOW COST AIRLINES
IN THE POST - 9/11 ENVIRONMENT
Carl A. Scheraga
Paul Caster
Fairfield University
ABSTRACT
It has been suggested in the literature that low-cost airlines have, in varying degrees, departed from
the original low-cost model introduced by Southwest Airlines. This study provides a multi-year
analysis in the post-9/11 time period, for the years 2004-2009, of the demonstrated strategic
positioning choices of U. S. low-cost airlines. The sample utilized is restricted to U. S. low-cost
carriers so as not to conflate operating environments. Furthermore, a quantitative methodology is
employed to measure effectively these choices and to facilitate inter-airline comparisons. Airlines, as
part of their strategic planning process, articulate positions with regard to cost leadership, product
differentiation, and growth. Decisions implemented are dynamic and inter-temporal in nature.
Managers thus need a multi-period methodology to evaluate the implementation of strategic
positions. One such approach is the strategic analysis of operating income utilized in this study.
INTRODUCTION
Michael Porter in his seminal work Competitive
Strategy (1980) outlines three generic strategies
that a firm can pursue in the building of a
competitive advantage vis-a-vis its competitors.
These three strategies are: cost leadership,
product differentiation, and a focused niche that
eschews an industry-wide strategy for a narrow
market segment. The emergence of the low cost
model in the commerical airline industry
represents a movement from the predominant
product differentiation strategies of U. S. trunk
carriers to the low cost model as introduced by
Southwest Airlines.
The goal of a differentiation strategy is the
creation of a product or service that is perceived
industrywide as being unique. This uniqueness
allows the firm to command a premium price
and therefore higher profit margins.
Differentiation can occur along such lines as
brand or image, technological innovation,
quality of product or service, or customer
service, among others. The goal of a cost
leadership strategy is the aggressive pursuit of
efficient scale facilities, cost reductions from
accumulated operational experience and control
of overhead, the avoidance of marginal

contribution customers, and the minimization of
expenditures on research and development,
service, sales force, and advertising (Porter,
1980). Thus, the model introduced by
Southwest Airlines (see Alamdari and Fagan,
2005) was characterized by fares that were low
and unrestricted, high frequency point-to-point
flights with no interlining. Flights were singleclass with high density unassigned seating
without meals or free (alcoholic) beverages or
snacks, and purchasable light drinks. Travel
agents and call centers (later the Internet)
operated with a ticketless format. A single type
of aircraft was intensively utilized with flights
into and from secondary and uncongested
airports in order to facilitate quick turnaround
time. Human resource cost effectiveness and
productivity was achieved through competive
wage rates and profit sharing.
Two points need to be noted here. The focus
strategy may be implemented either on the basis
of cost leadership or product differentiation in a
narrow market segment. As suggested by
Alamdari and Fagan (2005), such a strategy
would not seem to apply to low cost commercial
airlines in the United States. (They note that
corporate jet service providers might fall into
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this strategic group.) However, there is a
second, critically important issue. Porter (1980)
notes that a firm that does not develop a viable
strategy is “stuck in the middle.” While it takes
time and effort for a firm to extracate itself from
such a situation, it is not uncommon for firms
that are stuck in the middle to move back and
forth among the generic strategies in an
inconsistent manner. Frequently, such behavior
leads to failure.

cost model. Specifically, such markets may be
chosen to avoid competition (pg. 16).

Evolution of the Cost Leadership Model by
Airlines and Strategic Groups:The U. S. Case
Strategies chosen by firms are dynamic and
evolutionary by the nature of competition. This
notion is illustrated in Porter’s (1980)
admonition as to the risks or vulnerabilites of the
cost leadership strategy. Competitors may learn
how to implement the low cost model through
imitation or investment in state-of-the-art
facilities. Carey and Nicas (2011) indicate that
this has happened to Southwest Airlines, as other
low cost carriers, such as JetBlue Airways and
Spirit Airlines have cut into Southwest’s
competitive advantage. Technological changes
or innovations may nullify the advantages that
had accrued to the low cost leader through prior
learning and investments. The low cost leader
may become so preoccupied with cost that
necessary product and marketing changes are
overlooked. Finally, inflation in costs may erode
the profit margins enjoyed by the low cost leader
relative to firms pursuing a differentiation strategy.

To date, only Alamdari and Fagan (2005) have
undertaken an empirical examination of the
evolution of the cost leadership model on the
part of commercial airlines designated as low
cost carriers. However, their study compared
airline low cost strategic models at a single point
in time – the year 2001. In correlating model
choice to performance this is problematic not
only because of the issue of the single year
utilized but also because of the extremely
confounding event of 9/11. Additionally, similar
to Button (2009), their study groups U. S. low
cost airlines with European low cost airlines.
This makes it very difficult to isolate the
endogenous effects of management‘s strategic
choices from the exogenous effects of the operating
environment in which airlines conduct business.

Button (2009) offers a critical view of the
efficacy of the implementation of the low cost
model in the commercial airline industry, in a
combined analysis of U. S. and European low
cost carriers. He suggests that “there are, in
addition, reasons to suspect that the model as we
have seen it in the past, will need to change to
succeed in a dynamic market and, in the short
term, to function well in the depressed macroeconomic environments...”(pg. 2). Furthermore,
he also suggests that where low cost carriers
have enjoyed financial success it may be because
of the particular markets they have chosen rather
than their particular implementation of the low
78
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Thus, there are two important empirical
questions to be investigated. The first is whether
the low cost model in the commercial airline
industry has indeed evolved over time in the
context outlined by Porter (1980). The second is
how well has the low cost model been
implemented.

Evaluating the evolution of a low cost airline’s
strategy requires a methodology for classifying
carriers using Porter’s (1980) generic strategies.
Kling and Smith (1995) present a methodology
for identifying strategic groups amongst U. S.
trunk carriers, Southwest, and the then low cost
carrier America West. Their study covered the
time period 1991-1993. Airline membership in
particular strategic groups was done utilizing the
two variables of cost per seat mile and the
Airline Quality Rating index calculated by the
National Institute for Aviation Research.
The current study focuses on the evolution of the
low cost model by U. S. carriers in the post 9/11
timeframe. The period examined is 2004 to
2009. A methodology called strategic variance
analysis is used for decomposing operating
income into three components: (1) growth, (2)

price recovery, and (3) productivity. The price
recovery component assesses a firm’s product
differentiation strategy and the productivity
component assesses a firm’s low-cost strategy.
Thus, this framework is very much in the spirit
of Porter’s (1980) seminal work. Furthermore,
the framework allows for the separation of the
impacts of endogenous managerial decisions and
exogenous industry-wide effects.
STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
Strategic variance analysis combines Porter’s
(1980) strategies with traditional accounting
variance analysis. An accounting variance is the
difference between an expected amount and an
actual result. Shank and Churchill (1977)
illustrate how variance analysis is used to break
down net income into revenue and cost
components in order to gain further insights into
the underlying factors that affected profitability.
Shank and Govindarajan (1993) advanced this
analysis by tying the accounting variances to
Porter’s low cost leadership and product
differentiation strategies. Then, by examining an
organization’s mission and strategy, the
variances are used to determine the extent to
which the organization is fulfilling its mission,
or where improvements are needed.
Horngren, et al. (2000, 2006, and 2012) illustrate
the use of strategic variance analysis for a
fictitious manufacturer of computer chips. In
their example, management chooses a cost
leadership strategy and the company experiences
an increase in profits. Strategic variance analysis
is used to determine how much of the increased
profitability was due to management’s choice of
strategy. As explained in Horngren (2012), the
growth component measures the change in
revenues minus the change in costs due solely to
a change in the quantity of output sold. The
price-recovery component is based on both
changes in selling prices and changes in the cost
of inputs. It relates to a company’s product
differentiation strategy and essentially measures
the effectiveness of such a strategy. That is, if
management is successful in implementing a
product differentiation strategy, they can charge

higher prices to compensate for the higher costs
associated with such a strategy. The productivity
component is directly related to the low cost
strategy. It measures the change in profitability
by operating the business more efficiently, by
either using fewer inputs or by using a less
expensive mix of inputs. The variances
associated with each component are measured
while holding all else equal, thereby isolating the
impact of that particular factor. Formulas for
each variance are in Appendix A. Also, see
Caster and Scheraga (2011) for a more detailed
explanation of each component.
Caster and Scheraga (2011) and Mudde and
Sopariwala (2008) apply strategic variance
analysis to companies in the airline industry. The
framework provided by Horngren, et al. (2000,
2006, and 2012) was adapted by Sopariwala
(2003) to include the impact of underutilization
of capacity. Capacity utilization is particularly
important in the airline industry, since
management makes changes to the fleet, or may
simply ground airplanes, thereby affecting
capacity utilization. The framework was also
modified due to differences between a service
industry and a manufacturer.
Mudde and Sopariwala (2008) use strategic
variance analysis to examine the performance of
Southwest Airlines for the year ending in 2005.
They adapted the Horngren, et al. (2000, 2006,
2012) framework by using cost drivers more
appropriate for an airline, such as revenue
passenger miles (RPMs) and available seat miles
(ASMs). They found that Southwest Airlines
continued its success pursuing a cost leadership
strategy.
Caster and Scheraga (2011) examine the
performance of all of the U.S. network air
carriers over two, three-year periods: 2004
through 2006 and 2007 through 2009. They
found that each of the network air carriers had
significant productivity gains in both periods, as
they engaged in major cost cutting to deal first
with the tragedy of 9/11 and its severe impact on
the airline industry, and later, with the economic
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TABLE 1
EXAMPLE: SOUTHWEST – FINANCIAL DATA ($)
Operating Revenues
Operating Expenses
Flying Operations
Maintenance
Depreciation and amortization
User charges
Station expenses
Aircraft and traffic servicing
Passenger services
Promotion and sales
General & Administrative
Transport related expenses
Operating profit

12/31/2003
5,936,696,000
5,454,620,000
1,849,777,000
671,590,000
385,815,000
168,467,000
937,762,000
1,106,229,000
451,714,000
589,271,000
386,176,000
14,048,000
482,076,000

12/31/2006
9,086,299,000
8,152,040,000
3,628,760,000
767,040,000
514,209,000
220,567,000
1,261,348,000
1,481,915,000
605,226,000
664,733,000
475,880,000
14,277,000
934,259,000

12/31/2009
10,350,338,000
10,088,296,000
4,573,216,000
1,068,072,000
617,685,000
308,705,000
1,411,332,000
1,720,037,000
738,475,000
727,645,000
626,607,000
16,559,000
262,042,000

Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial Data: Commercial Air Carriers, Series F,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009

TABLE 2
EXAMPLE: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES OPERATIONAL DATA
Revenue passenger enplanements
Revenue passenger miles
Available seat miles

12/31/2003
74,719,340
47,929,656,245
71,775,738,997

12/31/2006
96,276,907
67,676,690,192
92,642,334,641

12/31/2009
101,338,228
74,442,676,271
97,982,778,511

Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic: Commercial Air Carriers, Series T, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009

TABLE 3
EXAMPLE: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES – FUEL DATA
Total gallons used
Total fuel costs
Average fuel cost per gallon ($)

12/31/2003
1,142,651,100
828,356,287
0.72

12/31/2006
1,389,937,539
2,133,012,395
1.53

12/31/2009
1,427,868,309
2,891,970,226
2.03

Data Source: U. S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, TranStats Database, Washington, D. C., 2003, 2006, and 2009
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recession that began in mid-2008. They also
demonstrate how strategic variance analysis is
used to rank the performance of companies
within an industry segment, and thus how it may
be used for benchmarking purposes. In addition,
they demonstrate the use of strategic variance
analysis over multiple time periods, an important
extension given that managements’ choice of
strategies may take several years before tangible
results are achieved.
THE DATA SET
Low cost carriers were identified using the U.S.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics database. Data had to
be available in each of the six years under study.
With these criteria, five U.S. airlines remained in
the sample: Airtran Airways, Frontier Airlines,
JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines, and Spirit
Airlines. Data for calculation of the variances
are retrieved from: the International Civil
Aviation Organization, Financial Data:
Commercial Air Carriers, Series F and Traffic:
Commercial Air Carriers, Series T and also the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, Transtats Aviation
Database.
We chose two, three year time periods for the
analysis, 2004 to 2006, and 2007 to 2009. We
began the study with data from 2004 because it
took the airline industry approximately 2 1/2
years for flight activity to recover to pre-9/11
levels (Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
2005). Similar to Caster and Scheraga (2011),
we chose three-year timeframes to allow for an
appropriate amount of time for managements’
strategic decisions to impact profitability.
In addition to the five low-cost carriers, we also
calculate composite figures for all five airlines
combined, for each three-year period. The
composite figures are used for benchmarking
purposes and serve as a proxy for the relevant
market. Market figures are used to adjust the
growth component to separate out exogenous
effects from endogenous effects.

RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC
VARIANCE ANALYSIS
First, we illustrate the calculation of variances
using data for Southwest Airlines. Table 1 has
financial results for Southwest Airlines for the
years ending in 2003, 2006, and 2009.
Southwest Airlines had operating profits of
approximately $482 million in 2003, $934
million in 2006, and $262 million in 2009.
Strategic variance analysis is used to determine
why annual operating profits increased by $452
million in 2006, then decreased by $672 million
in 2009.
Table 2 provides the revenue passenger
enplanements, RPMs, and ASMs, used to
calculate the variances and Table 3 provides the
fuel data used in those calculations. Table 4
reclassifies the financial data into three cost
categories used by Mudde and Sopariwala
(2008) and by Caster and Scheraga (2011),
namely, fuel costs, flight-related costs, and
passenger-related costs. Finally, Table 5 provides
the calculations, using the data from Tables 2, 3,
and 4, from which the strategic variance analysis
is performed.
The results of the strategic variance analysis for
the three-year period ending in 2006 are
presented in Table 6 for all five airlines.
Continuing for the moment with the analysis of
Southwest Airlines as an example, as stated
earlier, the company’s annual operating profit
increased approximately $452 million in 2006
compared to 2003. Strategic variance analysis
reveals that operating profit increased by
approximately $600 million due to the growth
component. Increased revenues from growth of
$2.4 billion more than offset increased costs
from growth. Operating profit decreased by
approximately $626 million due to the pricerecovery component, driven primarily by
increased fuel costs. Southwest Airlines was not
able to pass all of its increased costs on to its
customers by charging higher fares. This result is
expected for a company choosing to be a low
cost leader. In contrast, operating profit
increased approximately $549 million due to
Spring/Summer 2012
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TABLE 4
EXAMPLE: SOUTHWEST AIURLINES – RECLASSIFIED FINANCIAL DATA ($)
12/31/2006

12/31/2003
Total operating revenues
Less: Total operating expenses
Fuel costs
Flight-related costs
Passenger-related costs
Operating income/(loss)

12/31/2009

9,086,299,000 10,350,338,000
8,152,040,000 10,088,296,000
2,133,012,395 2,891,970,226
3,872,379,605 4,748,643,774
2,146,648,000 2,447,682,000
934,259,000
262,042,000

5,936,696,000
5,454,620,000
828,356,287
2,930,763,713
1,695,500,000
482,076,000

FLIGHT RELATED COSTS

Flying operations
Less: Fuel cost
Flying operations (excluding fuel)
Maintenance
Passenger service
General and administrative
Depreciation and amortization
Transport related
Total flight-related costs

12/31/2003

12/31/2006

12/31/2009

1,849,777,000
828,356,287
1,021,420,713
671,590,000
451,714,000
386,176,000
385,815,000
14,048,000
2,930,763,713

3,628,760,000
2,133,012,395
1,495,747,605
767,040,000
605,226,000
475,880,000
514,209,000
14,277,000
3,872,379,605

4,573,216,000
2,891,970,226
1,681,245,774
1,068,072,000
738,475,000
626,607,000
617,685,000
16,559,000
4,748,643,774

PASSENGER RELATED COSTS
12/31/2003
Aircraft and traffic servicing
Promotion and sales
Total passenger-related costs

12/31/2006

12/31/2009

1,106,229,000 1,481,915,000 1,720,037,000
589,271,000
664,733,000
727,645,000
1,695,500,000 2,146,648,000 2,447,682,000

Data Sources: 1) Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial Data: Commercial Air Carriers,
Series F, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009 and 2) U. S. Department of Transportation, Research
and Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats Database, Washington, D. C., 2003,
2006, and 2009

82

Journal of Transportation Management

TABLE 5 1
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES–DATA USED IN STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
12/31/2003

12/31/2006

12/31/2009

Total operating revenues ($)
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs)
Average revenue per RPM

5,936,696,000
47,929,656,24
0.124

9,086,299,000
67,676,690,192
0.134

10,350,338,000
74,442,676,271
0.139

Revenue passenger miles (RPMs)
Available seat miles (ASMs)
Passenger load factor (%)
Hence, budgeted available seat miles

47,929,656,24
71,775,738,99
66.78%

67,676,690,192
92,642,334,641
73.05%
101,347,366,78

74,442,676,271
97,982,778,511
75.98%
101,904,264,33

Revenue passenger miles (RPMs)
Revenue passenger enplanements
Average revenue passenger miles per passenger ($)
Hence, budgeted revenue passenger enplanements

47,929,656,24
74,719,340
641.46

67,676,690,192
96,276,907
702.94
105,503,732

74,442,676,271
101,338,228
734.60
105,902,204

Number of gallons used
Available seat miles (ASMs)
Average number of gallons per ASM
Total flight-related costs ($)
Available seat miles (ASMs)
Average flight-related cost per ASM ($)

1,142,651,100
71,775,738,99
0.0159197
2,930,763,713
71,775,738,99
0.041

1,389,937,539
92,642,334,641
0.0150033
3,872,379,605
92,642,334,641
0.042

1,427,868,309
97,982,778,511
0.0145726
4,748,643,774
97,982,778,511
0.048

Total passenger-related costs ($)
Revenue passenger enplanements
Average cost per revenue passenger ($)

1,695,500,000
74,719,340
22.69

2,146,648,000
96,276,907
22.30

2,447,682,000
101,338,228
24.15

Revenue passenger (RPMs)
Available seat miles (ASMs)
Idle or unused capacity (ASMs)
Hence, budgeted idle capacity (ASMs)

47,929,656,24
71,775,738,99
23,846,082,75

67,676,690,192
92,642,334,641
24,965,644,449
33,670,676,594

74,442,676,271
97,982,778,511
23,540,102,240
27,461,588,064

Data Sources: 1) International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial Data: Commercial Air Carriers, Series F,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009, 2) International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic:
Commercial Air Carriers, Series T, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009, and 3) U. S. Department of
Transportation, Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats Database,
Washington, D. C., 2003, 2006, and 2009

1

Budgeted Available Seat Miles from year x to year y = Revenue Passenger Miles (year y) / Passenger Load Factor (year x), Budgeted Revenue
Passengers Enplanements from year x to year y = Revenue Passenger Miles (year y) / Average Revenue Passenger Miles per Passenger (year x),
and Budgeted Idle Capacity in year y = Budgeted Available Seat Miles (year y) – Revenue Passenger Miles (year y). [See Mudde and Sopariwala
(2008).]

Spring/Summer 2012

83

84

Journal of Transportation Management

GROWTH COMPONENT
2004-2006
Revenue effect
Fuel cost effect
Flight-related cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
PRICE-RECOVERY
COMPONENT 2004-2006
Revenue effect
Fuel cost effect
Flight-related cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
PRODUCTIVITY
COMPONENT 2004-2006
Fuel cost effect
Fuel (ASM) cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
CAPACITY
UNDERUTILIZATION
COMPONENT 2004-2006
Unused capacities
Available capacities
Used capacities
TOTAL
461,813,711
-68,644,066
-165,730,718
-133,507,046
93,931,881

79,829,289
-204,027,775
-45,576,335
33,986,897
-135,787,923

-45,074,561
55,966,507
3,815,149
14,707,095

-11,348,399
-164,643,372
165,730,718
-10,261,053

123,999,241
-348,846,166
-22,410,173
-14,147,151
-261,404,249

63,743,117
15,321,629
45,974,140
125,038,886

-8,423,510
-386,381,872
288,577,893
-106,227,489

Frontier

851,316,759
-166,119,025
-288,577,893
-198,212,989
198,406,852

Aitran

-7,854,281
-465,557,329
368,595,259
-104,816,352

-29,832,448
-23,178,542
-11,967,688
-64,978,678

343,030,276
-400,609,901
-34,734,613
-32,552,106
-124,866,344

1,021,875,724
-150,786,885
-368,595,259
-259,944,207
242,549,373

JetBlue

-917,782
364,527
217,857
262,463
-72,935

91,145,782
-218,284,811
-127,349,361
-823,498
-255,311,889

213,057,383
5,361,617
-11,975,965
206,443,036

-29,245,462
4,219,107
-217,857
-25,244,212

703,682,319
-1,306,337,240
-65,444,130
41,671,686
-626,427,364

142,538,095
200,426,096
205,726,865
548,691,056

-24,142,062
-852,029,699
806,315,495
-69,856,267

Spirit

2,445,920,681
-341,283,059
-806,315,495
-698,546,551
599,775,576

Southwest

TABLE 6
STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS 2004-2006

-87,670,145
-1,885,653,014
1,639,026,992
-334,296,167

449,393,257
296,098,196
326,932,258
1,072,423,710

1,221,707,010
-2,568,641,310
-267,598,334
-383,219
-1,614,915,854

4,899,988,990
-783,095,650
-1,639,026,992
-1,356,789,039
1,121,077,310

Composite
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GROWTH COMPONENT
2007-2009
Revenue effect
Fuel cost effect
Flight-related cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
PRICE-RECOVERY
COMPONENT 2007-2009
Revenue effect
Fuel cost effect
Flight-related cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
PRODUCTIVITY
COMPONENT 2007-2009
Fuel cost effect
Fuel (ASM) cost effect
Passenger-related effect
TOTAL
CAPACITY
UNDERUTILIZATION
COMPONENT 2007-2009
Unused capacities
Available capacities
Used capacities
TOTAL
46,557,147
-14,377,511
-17,404,328
-10,954,797
3,820,511

-64,866,147
55,683,950
42,753,262
-7,687,977
25,883,088

42,044,792
3,338,915
-8,255,226
37,128,481

9,975,525
-14,835,933
17,404,328
12,543,920

-194,448,846
101,965,659
-8,677,753
-24,026,889
-125,187,828

34,648,449
58,630,944
56,899,547
150,178,940

-2,243,040
-192,681,349
211,146,407
16,222,018

Frontier

642,535,846
-208,721,910
-211,146,407
-129,003,658
93,663,871

Aitran

-53,919,202
-131,068,439
86,425,648
-98,561,993

-47,628,722
-21,494,913
-61,559,481
-130,683,116

656,621,063
-7,920,717
-210,904,708
-92,396,793
345,398,845

267,533,937
-85,099,299
-86,425,648
-63,216,726
32,792,264

JetBlue

162,150,926
-53,498,622
-70,216,640
-42,389,820
-3,954,155

-3,479,926
33,659,111
87,516,675
48,498,898
166,194,757

24,377,022
-4,058,428
-6,216,078
14,102,516

22,612,030
-95,079,789
70,216,640
-2,251,119

355,635,052
-750,330,172
-496,147,089
-196,658,975
-1,087,501,184

88,877,543
115,742,995
110,236,394
314,856,932

-156,890,560
-223,226,520
282,813,107
-97,303,973

Spirit

908,403,948
-213,248,197
-282,813,107
-214,611,419
197,731,225

Southwest

TABLE 7
STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS 2007-2009

-172,070,803
-654,765,028
655,418,204
-171,417,627

149,888,041
147,149,329
120,699,446
417,736,816

760,601,471
-603,673,984
-595,981,059
-293,074,871
-732,128,442

2,016,041,529
-540,772,496
-655,418,204
-468,967,575
350,883,253

Composite

gains in productivity. Again, this result is
expected for a company choosing to be a low
cost leader. Finally, the capacity underutilization
component shows a decline in operating profit of
approximately $70 million.
Table 7 shows the results of the strategic
variance analysis for the three-year period
ending in 2009. Southwest Airline’s annual
operating profit in 2009 was $262 million, a
decline of $672 million from three years earlier.
The four components of strategic variance
analysis yield results similar to the prior threeyear period. That is, Southwest Airlines
operating profits increased due to growth of the
market and due to productivity gains, and
decreased due to the price-recovery effect and
capacity underutilization. However, the decrease
in operating profits due to the price-recovery
component of almost $1.1 billion overwhelmed
the increases due to the growth and productivity
components. As seen in Table 7, prices of inputs,
namely fuel costs, flight-related costs, and
passenger-related costs all increased at rates
much higher than Southwest’s fare increases
designed to help recover those costs.
Over the years, Southwest Airlines has seen an
increase in competition from other airlines that
identify themselves as low cost carriers.
Strategic variance analysis can be used to rank
the relative performance of each of these
carriers, on each of the components. Table 8 has
the results of the strategic variance analysis for
all five airlines for the three-year period ending
in 2006. The data are normalized by dividing by
billions of RPMs. During this three-year period,
all but Spirit Airways had an increase in
operating profits due to growth. Airtran ranked
first in the growth component, while Southwest
Airlines ranked fourth. As expected, all five
airlines saw decreases in operating profits due to
price-recovery. The increased cost of fuel was
especially significant for all five airlines, and
increased fares were not sufficient to recover the
increased costs. JetBlue Airways ranked first,
and thus did the best job of recovering its
increased fuel and other costs, while Spirit
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Airlines ranked fifth. Spirit Airlines had a much
higher increase in fuel costs, and also had a very
significant increase in flight-related costs
compared to the competition. As low cost
leaders, one would expect significant gains in
operating profits from productivity. In fact, only
Spirit Airlines had significant gains in
productivity, while gains were more modest for
Airtran, Southwest, and Frontier. Surprisingly,
JetBlue Airways saw a decrease in operating
profits due to productivity. Finally, capacity
utilization was negative for all five airlines, but
not a significant factor in the change in overall
profitability.
Table 9 is similar to Table 8, but covers the three
year period ending in 2009. The growth
component results are very similar to the prior
three year period. Airtran again ranked first and
Spirit again ranked fifth, and was the only airline
to see a decrease in operating profits due to
growth. Table 9 reveals a significant change in
price-recovery rankings compared to the prior
period. In the prior period, all five airlines saw
decreases in operating profits due primarily to
increased fuel costs. In the latter period, Spirit
Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Frontier Airlines
all experienced a positive impact from pricerecovery. Most interesting is JetBlue Airways,
which raised fares significantly during this
period and more than covered the increased
costs of inputs. Spirit Airlines and Frontier
Airlines achieved the positive results by
decreasing the cost of inputs, particularly fuel
costs and flight-related costs. Spirit Airlines also
reduced its passenger-related costs during this
period. In contrast, Airtran Airways saw a
decrease in operating profits due to the pricerecovery component. It successfully reduced the
price of fuel, but it lowered rather than raised its
fares during this timeframe. Southwest Airlines
ranked last in price-recovery. Its fare increases
were unable to recover its increased cost of
inputs, particularly fuel costs. For the
productivity component, the rankings were
somewhat different, in that Spirit Airlines
dropped from first to fourth. JetBlue Airways
continued to be a surprise as the only low cost
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Frontier

JetBlue

Southwest

Spirit

Composite

4

2

2

3

4

5

2

1

3

5

1

3

1

3

2

4

4

1

5

5

GROWTH COMPONENT
2004-2006
61,713,785
55,538,492 43,847,309
36,141,257
-200,918
41,592,065
Revenue effect
-12,042,326
-8,255,251
-6,470,062
-5,042,845
79,801
-6,647,069
Fuel cost effect
-11,914,228
47,692
-13,912,382
-20,919,633
-19,931,054 -15,815,925
Flight-related cost effect
-10,321,819
57,457
-11,516,691
-14,368,886
-16,055,781 -11,153,855
Passenger-related effect
8,862,366
-15,967
9,515,923
14,382,940
11,296,406 10,407,466
TOTAL
PRICE-RECOVERY
COMPONENT 2004-2006
10,397,706
19,953,318
10,370,088
8,988,972
9,600,404 14,718,966
Revenue effect
-19,302,617
-47,786,153
-21,803,130
-25,288,610
-24,536,723 -17,189,630
Fuel cost effect
-967,011
-27,878,880
-2,271,427
-1,624,562
-5,481,087
-1,490,415
Flight-related cost effect
-1,025,557
4,087,321
-1,396,767
615,747
-180,277
-3,253
Passenger-related effect
-9,256,176
-55,891,992
-13,707,722
-18,949,757
-16,330,084
-5,357,846
TOTAL
PRODUCTIVITY
COMPONENT 2004-2006
4,620,876
-5,420,742
-1,280,070
2,106,162
46,641,783
3,814,538
Fuel cost effect
1,110,698
6,730,626
-994,560
2,961,523
1,173,747
2,513,339
Fuel (ASM) cost effect
3,039,848
-2,621,737
2,775,065
3,332,764
458,816
-513,517
Passenger-related effect
9,064,338
1,768,700
-2,788,147
8,107,534
45,193,793
9,102,942
TOTAL
CAPACITY
UNDERUTILIZATION
COMPONENT 2004-2006
-610,638
-1,364,778
-337,017
-356,726
-6,402,315
-744,161
Unused capacities
-28,009,654
-19,800,288 -19,976,437
-12,589,707
923,632
-16,005,791
Available capacities
11,914,228
-47,692
13,912,382
20,919,633
19,931,054 15,815,925
Used capacities
-7,700,659
-1,234,011
-4,497,528
-1,032,206
-5,526,375
-2,837,571
TOTAL
Note: Numbers in shaded areas are rankings, from 1 to 5, of the effect of a component on operating income.

Aitran

TABLE 8
NORMALIZED STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS 2004-2006
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4

3

2

1

1

4

1

2

5

5

2

3

4

3

5

2

5

3

4

1

Aitran
Frontier
JetBlue
Southwest
Spirit
Composite
GROWTH COMPONENT
2007-2009
34,776,819
5,377,804 10,312,130
12,202,731
27,303,356
15,086,854
Revenue effect
-11,296,933
-1,660,742
-3,280,163
-2,864,596
-9,008,224
-4,046,819
Fuel cost effect
-11,428,157
-2,010,369
-3,331,288
-3,799,072
-11,823,244
-4,904,759
Flight-related cost effect
-6,982,236
-1,265,386
-2,436,697
-2,882,908
-7,137,698
-3,509,474
Passenger-related effect
5,069,494
441,306
1,263,982
2,656,154
-665,810
2,625,801
TOTAL
PRICE-RECOVERY
COMPONENT 2007-2009
4,777,301
-585,958
5,691,888
-10,524,413
-7,492,671 25,309,542
Revenue effect
5,518,823
6,432,038
-305,305
-10,079,301
5,667,601
-4,517,536
Fuel cost effect
-469,678
4,938,418
-8,129,349
-6,664,821
14,736,265
-4,459,967
Flight-related cost effect
-1,300,439
-888,036
-3,561,446
-2,641,750
8,166,359
-2,193,198
Passenger-related effect
-6,775,707
2,989,749 13,313,442
-14,608,572
27,984,266
-5,478,813
TOTAL
PRODUCTIVITY
COMPONENT 2007-2009
1,193,906
4,104,661
1,121,673
1,875,324
4,856,583
-1,835,855
Fuel cost effect
1,554,794
-683,368
1,101,178
3,173,360
385,677
-828,524
Fuel (ASM) cost effect
3,079,650
-953,559
-2,372,818
1,480,823
-1,046,678
903,243
Passenger-related effect
4,229,522
2,374,615
3,126,093
8,128,334
4,288,701
-5,037,197
TOTAL
CAPACITY
UNDERUTILIZATION
COMPONENT 2007-2009
-121,403
1,152,270
-2,078,322
-2,107,535
3,807,467
-1,287,675
Unused capacities
-10,428,748
-1,713,695
-5,052,050
-2,998,636
-16,009,760
-4,899,871
Available capacities
11,428,157
2,010,369
3,331,288
3,799,072
11,823,244
4,904,759
Used capacities
-1,307,099
-379,049
-1,282,787
878,006
1,448,945
-3,799,085
TOTAL
Note: Numbers in shaded areas are rankings, from 1 to 5, of the effect of a component on operating income.

TABLE 9
NORMALIZED STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS 2007-2009

carrier to experience a decline in operating
profits due to productivity changes. The impact
of capacity utilization was not very significant
compared to the other components. Airtran
Airways and Frontier Airlines experienced gains
in operating profitability related to capacity,
while the other three carriers experienced
decreases similar to the earlier time period.
The growth component is impacted by
exogenous changes in the market in addition to
endogenous changes brought about by
management’s strategic decisions. Horngren,
Datar and Rajan (2012) provide an adjustment to
the growth component to estimate the percentage

of change in profitability attributable to
management’s decisions. Following Caster and
Scheraga (2011), we calculate a market
adjustment and apply it only to the growth
component, since management may choose a
blended strategy rather than strictly following a
product differentiation or cost leadership
strategy. Table 10 provides the results of further
analyzing the growth component.
Table 10a shows the calculations for each airline
of the endogenous percentage of growth for the
three-year period ending in 2006. Using
Southwest Airlines as an example, their market
grew by 41.2 percent, as measured by the change

TABLE 10a
IMPACT OF ENDOGENOUS STRATEGIES – GROWTH COMPONENT 2004-2006
(12/31/03 - 12/31/06)
Airtran
Frontier
JetBlue
Southwest
Spirit
Composite

RPMs 2004
7,157,394,690.01
4,664,512,745.57
11,516,971,262.83
47,929,656,245.03
4,577,285,154.70
75,958,831,424.48

RPMs 2006
13,794,596,431.84
8,315,200,789.89
23,305,323,597.69
67,676,690,191.78
4,567,951,103.06
117,810,669,689.02

ǻ92.73
78.27
102.36
41.20
-0.20
55.10

ENDOGENOUS
40.58
29.60
46.17
-33.74
-27,650

Endogenous Effect = [%ǻ530V -2006) Airline i - ǻ530V -2006) Market ] /
_ǻ530V -2006) Airline i |
TABLE 10b
IMPACT OF ENDOGENOUS STRATEGIES – GROWTH COMPONENT 2007-2009
(12/31/06 – 12/31/09)
Airtran
Frontier
JetBlue
Southwest
Spirit
Composite

RPMs 2009
RPMs 2007
13,794,596,431.84 18,475,980,896.56
8,315,200,789.89
8,657,279,052.83
23,305,323,597.69 25,943,616,840.15
67,676,690,191.78 74,442,676,270.58
4,567,951,103.06
5,938,864,220.45
117,810,669,689.02 133,629,024,310.53

ǻ33.94
4.11
11.32
10.00
30.01
13.43

ENDOGENOUS
60.43
-226.38
-18.61
-34.30
55.26

(QGRJHQRXV(IIHFW >ǻ530V -2009) Airline i - ǻ530V -2009) Market ] /
_ǻ530V -2009) Airline i |
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in RPMs. On the surface, this appears to be a
strong increase, which resulted in almost $600
million in additional operating profits as shown
in Table 6. However, the relevant market as a
whole, as measured by the change in RPMs for
the composite, increased by 55.1 percent.
Therefore, Southwest Airline’s growth in this
period actually fell short of the overall market
growth by almost 13.9 percent. Thus,
management’s decisions resulted in a 33.74
percent decrease in operating profit due to the
growth component. In contrast, JetBlue Airways
experienced growth of 102.36 percent in this
period, which is 47.26 percentage points better
than the overall market, meaning that 46.17
percent of the increase is due to endogenous
factors.
Table 10b shows similar adjustments for the
three-year period ending in 2009. Table 7 shows
that before adjustments, all but Spirit Airlines
experienced positive changes in operating profits
due to growth. However, after adjusting for
exogenous factors, Table 10b shows very
different results. Airtran Airways and Spirit
Airlines had positive changes from endogenous
factors, but Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways,
and Southwest Airlines all experienced negative
changes from endogenous factors. According to
Horngren, Datar and Rajan(2012), companies
following a cost leadership strategy should
experience positive changes due to growth, so
these results are somewhat unexpected.
Stage Length, and Domestic Compared to
Foreign Operations
Stage length may have an influence on an
airline’s operating profit. Average stage length is
defined as “the average distance between
takeoffs and landings” (Caves, Christensen and
Trethaway, 1984). As the average stage length
increases, the cost per unit may decrease. Caves,
Christensen and Trethaway, 1981 and Tretheway
(1984) find, however, that the posited effect
between average stage length and unit cost is
ambiguous. Table 11 shows the average stage
length for each airline for 2004, 2006, and 2009.
Standard deviation calculations suggest that
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average stage length is not significant for these
five airlines over the period in this study.
The extent to which an airline has international
routes compared to domestic routes may have an
impact on operating efficiency. Fethi, Jackson
and Weyman-Jones (2002) suggest that spatial
disparities in the operating environment result
when an airline increases its international focus.
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of
differences in international focus, a priori, some
arguments suggest the impact on operating profit
may be negative. In structuring bilateral
agreements, the international air transport
system has tended to focus on small sets of
routes, or even individual routes between
countries thus hampering global efficiency.
Legal, public policy, and tax differences with
respect to air transport exist across countries,
which may impede operating efficiency. In
addition, the level of competition in certain
global markets is impacted by airport
infrastructure constraints.
The ratio of domestic scheduled RPMs to
international scheduled RPMs captures the
international focus of an airline. A simple
analysis was performed to detect any outliers in
the sample utilized in this study. A standard
score, the number of standard deviations above
or below the mean, was calculated with regard to
the degree of dominance of domestic operations.
Given the size of the sample, outliers were
defined as those observations with standard
scores of 2.5 or greater. As can be seen from
Table 11, there are no such outliers, which
suggests that the impact of an international
focus, if any, is minimal for the airlines in the
sample.
Fleet Standardization
Brüggen and Klose (2010) suggest various cost
advantages to fleet standardization or
commonality of aircraft on the part of an airline.
Fewer aircraft types in an airline’s fleet reduces
the number of reserve crews that are needed and
increases the carrier’s ability to swap crews and
reduce the required personnel training.

TABLE 11
AVERAGE STAGE LENGTH (MILES) AND DOMESTIC RPMs AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RPMs
SDFM

-0.88
0.17
1.41
-1.04

Domestic/Total
(%)
99.16
95.03
98.93
100.00

1006.95

0.34

98.69

0.17

Airtran 2006
Frontier 2006
JetBlue 2006
Southwest
2006
Spirit 2006

651.95
902.88
1185.01
621.70

-0.87
0.23
1.47
-1.00

99.65
93.05
97.83
100.00

0.80
-0.67
0.40
0.88

886.92

0.16

89.75

-1.41

Airtran 2009
Frontier 2009
JetBlue 2009
Southwest
2009
Spirit 2009

737.25
883.36
1075.13
638.70

-0.68
0.18
1.31
-1.26

99.07
93.70
87.99
100.00

0.86
0.15
-0.61
0.98

931.23

0.46

82.28

-1.38

Airtran 2004
Frontier 2004
JetBlue 2004
Southwest
2004
Spirit 2004

Average Stage
Length
626.97
953.84
1338.01
576.23

SDFM

0.41
-1.73
0.29
0.85

SDFM = Standard Deviations from Mean
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic: Commercial Air Carriers, Series T, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada, 2004, 2006, and 2009

Standardized maintenance processes allow for
fewer spare parts and reduced labor costs. Fleet
commonality allows for the standardization of
ground handling processes, economies of scale
realized from the standardization of ground
handling equipment, and lower labor costs.
Finally, an airline ordering several planes of the
same type will typically pay a lower per capita
price than its counterpart, which orders a
mixture of aircraft from various manufacturers.
This study utilizes the index of fleet
standardization developed by De Borges Pan and
Espirito Santo (2004) and modified by Brüggen
and Klose (2010). This index, the IPC, is a
composite of several partial indices. Thus:

(1) IPPCC = (no. of aircraft in the family) /
(AMF x TFC) where AMF is the number of
aircraft models/types in a family and TFC is the
number of aircraft in the fleet. Each fleet family
with more than one type is given a “bonus” of
0.1. This is necessary, as otherwise fleet
families would count as diversified as totally
different aircraft (Klose, 2009).
(2) IPPC = (ÓIPPCC) / (no. of families from the
manufacturer)
(3) IPC = (ÓIPPC) / (no. of manufacturers)
This index ranges from zero to one. It is
inversely proportional to the number of models,
fleet families, and manufacturers in an airline’s
fleet.
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The results displayed in Table 12 must be
interpreted with care. While there appears to be
a range in the levels of fleet standardization,
scrutiny is required. Consider Southwest
Airlines, whose indices range from 0.3500 to
0.4333. In fact, its fleet is composed of a single
aircraft family, the Boeing 737, with the
predominant utilization of the 300, 500, and 700
models. Airtran’s fleet is, by and large, divided
between two Boeing aircraft types, the 717-200
and the 737-700 families. Frontier, for the most
part, has a fleet composed of a single Airbus
family of aircraft with the A318, A319, and
A320 models. Similarly, JetBlue has a fleet
composed of two aircraft types, the Airbus A320
and Embraer ERJ190. These observations
suggest that none of the low cost carriers in the
sample utilized in this study indulged in a
diversity of aircraft types. Table 13 presents the
details of each carrier’s fleet composition.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting results were revealed in this
study. First, although JetBlue Airways is a selfproclaimed low-cost carrier, it does not behave
like one. Companies following the cost
leadership strategy should experience greater
profitability in the growth component and in the
productivity component. Table 8 reveals that
JetBlue Airways ranked third in profitability due
to growth, while Table 10a reveals that 46.17
percent of that growth was endogenous. Table 9
reveals that JetBlue Airways again ranked third
in profitability due to growth, while Table 10b
shows that endogenous factors have a negative
impact of 18.61 percent. In addition, and even
more revealing, was JetBlue Airways ranking
last place in productivity in both periods, as
shown in Tables 8 and 9. Not only did JetBlue
rank last, but also the productivity component
was negative in both periods. These are not

TABLE 12
FLEET DIVERSIFICATION INDICES
Carrier

Year

IPC

Airtran
Airtran
Airtran

2004
2006
2009

0.3123
0.5000
0.5000

Frontier
Frontier
Frontier

2004
2006
2009

0.3556
0.6000
0.4333

JetBlue
JetBlue
JetBlue

2004
2006
2009

1.0000
0.5000
0.5000

Southwest
Southwest
Southwest

2004
2006
2009

0.3500
0.4333
0.4333

Spirit
Spirit
Spirit

2004
2006
2009

0.5000
0.3833
0.6000

Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Fleet – Personnel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2004, 2006,
and 2009
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2006

2009

2004

2006

2009

Airtran

Airtran

Frontier

Frontier

Frontier

2009

JetBlue

Airbus A319
Boeing 737-300
Airbus A318
Airbus A319
Airbus A318
Airbus A319
Airbus A320
Airbus A320
Airbus A320
Embraer ERJ190
Airbus A320

Model
McDonnell Douglas DC9-30
Boeing 717-200
Boeing 737-700
Boeing 717-200
Boeing 737-700
Boeing 717-200
Boeing 737-700
Airbus A318
29
10
7
45
10
38
3
61
91
15
109

Number
1
76
4
86
30
86
51
6

Spirit

Spirit

Spirit

Southwest

Southwest

Southwest

Carrier

2009

2006

2004

2009

2006

2004

Year

Boeing 737-300
Boeing 737-500
Boeing 737-700
Airbus A321
McDonnell Douglas DC9-80
Airbus A319
Airbus A321
McDonnell Douglas DC9-80
Airbus A319
Airbus A321

Model
Embraer ERJ190
Boeing 737-100
Boeing 737-300
Boeing 737-500
Boeing 737-700
Boeing 737-300
Boeing 737-500
Boeing 737-700

Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Fleet – Personnel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2004, 2006, and 2009

2004
2006

JetBlue
JetBlue

Airtran

Year
2004

Carrier

TABLE 13
FLEET COMPOSITION

181
25
303
2
31
18
6
12
26
2

Number
38
14
195
25
169
193
25
245

results typical of a company following a cost
leadership strategy.
In Table 8, it can be seen that JetBlue Airways
ranked first in the price-recovery component for
the three-year period ending in 2006. Although
the overall impact on operating profits was
negative, it was less negative than for the other
airlines in the sample. In Table 9, JetBlue
Airways ranked second in the price-recovery
component, and the component had a positive
effect on operating profits. Taken together, these
results suggest that the management of JetBlue
Airways is following a product differentiation
strategy. A product differentiator is able to
charge higher prices to more than recover the
higher cost of inputs associated with such a
strategy.
A second interesting finding relates to the
overall viability of following a low cost strategy
over the long term. For the three-year period
ending in 2009, the airlines in the sample saw
gains in annual operating profits of
approximately $351 million due to growth and
approximately $418 million due to productivity,
as shown by the composite results in Table 7.
However, those gains were not enough to cover
decreases of approximately $732 million due to
price-recovery and $171 million due to capacity
underutilization. Increases in both the cost of
fuel and in flight-related costs excluding fuel
were not offset by increases in airfares. A further
look reveals that the composite results were
driven by Southwest Airlines, the allegedly lowcost leader of the industry. In fact, it is
interesting to note that Southwest Airlines did
not rank first for any component of profitability
for either period except for capacity
underutilization during the three-year period
ending in 2006.
A third interesting result is support for the notion
that management may not strictly adhere to one
strategy over another. The results support the
notion of a blended strategy. For example, Table
9 shows that Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways,
and Spirit Airlines all saw increases in
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profitability from the price-recovery component
for the three-year period ending in 2009. JetBlue
achieved the result as a true product
differentiator, charging higher fares to recover its
higher cost of inputs. Frontier and Spirit actually
lowered fares during this period, but they were
also able to lower the cost of inputs to increase
overall profitability.
Finally, this paper illustrates the usefulness of
strategic variance analysis as a methodology for
examining the determinants of profitability and
tying those determinants to management’s
strategic decisions.

APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF STRATEGIC VARIANCES FROM YEAR i TO Year j
The Growth Component
1. Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected revenue due to lower RPM)]
Variance = {Year i revenue/RPM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
2. Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected fuel costs due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i fuel cost/gallon} * {Year i gallons used per ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j
budgeted ASMs}
3. Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected flight-related costs due to
lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i passenger load factor} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j
budgeted ASMs}
4. Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected passenger-related
costs due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/passenger} * {Year i revenue passengers – Year j budgeted revenue
passengers}
The Price-Recovery Component
1. Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher revenue due to higher airfares)]
Variance = {Year j RPMs} * {Year j revenue/RPM – Year i revenue/RPM}
2. Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher fuel prices)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used/ASM} * {Year i fuel cost/gallon – Year j
fuel cost/gallon}
3. Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher flightrelated costs per ASM)]
Variance = {Year j passenger load factor} * {Year j actual ASMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j cost/
ASM}
4. Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher
costs per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted revenue passengers} * {Year i cost/passenger – Year j cost/passenger}
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The Productivity Component
1. Fuel Costs (a)
[Fuel cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to lower fuel usage per
gallon)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used /ASM – Year
j gallons used/ASM}
2. Fuel Costs (b)
[Fuel (ASM) cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher passenger
load factor)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j gallons used/ASM} * {Year j budgeted ASMs – Year j
actual ASMs}
3. Passenger-related costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher miles
per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j cost/passenger} * {Year j budgeted revenue passengers – Year j revenue
passengers}
The Capacity Underutilization Component
1. Flight-related costs (a)
[Changes in flight-related costs relating to unused capacities (i.e., higher unit costs to acquire
capacity that is unused)]
Variance = {Year j actual ASMs – Year j RPMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j cost/ASM}
2. Flight-related costs (b)
[Changes in flight-related costs of available capacities (i.e., lower underutilization due to
decrease in available capacity)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j actual ASMs}
3. Flight-related costs (c)
[Changes in flight-related costs of used capacities (i.e., higher underutilization due to decrease in
capacity used)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
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